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Summary
This research examines human resource management (HRM) in subsidiaries of US
multinational firms (MNCs) operating in the UK and Germany. Together with parallel
studies in Ireland and Spain it explores the potential tensions resulting from a transfer of
US-type human resource (HR) policies to Europe. Whilst we expected that the liberal
market British economy would not provide a major challenge for the transfer of US
practices, we foresaw that the more densely institutionalized German business system
would constitute a more serious barrier to transfer.
This report is based on case studies of four large US MNCs. In all four firms we conducted
interviews in the British and German subsidiaries, as well as the US and/or European
headquarters, with HR managers, line managers and non-managerial employees. For
three substantive issues – diversity management, employee participation and pay – as well
as for the processual issue of ‘centralization–decentralization’ this report analyses
whether the four US MNCs studied have global policies, how these are transferred to
Europe and the extent to which they have to be adapted to the British and German
contexts.
Our findings support previous research which suggests that HR policies in US MNCs are
not only relatively standardised, but also build on US domestic policies. However, the
mechanisms of transfer appear to have changed. Whereas in the past, written guidelines,
the transfer of home-country employees and extensive reporting seem to have been the
major mechanisms employed to ensure that global policies were applied, today HR
information systems, regional European headquarters and international teams of HR
managers seem to play a more important role. Over the last decade, national subsidiaries
in both countries have lost autonomy in HR decision-making. However, this has not been
primarily in the form of recentralization towards headquarters, but rather towards the
regional level and/or business unit.
Turning to substantive issues, as expected, the German institutional environment
represents a stronger challenge for US MNCs than the British one. Of particular
importance is codetermination which affects all four firms and which in at least three of
them exerts pressure on local management to adjust global polices to local conditions.
However, in most cases the observed deviations were only marginal. Similarly, the German
system of multi-employer bargaining does not constitute a major hurdle for US MNCs
seeking to apply global practices. Although in general German host-country pressures
were stronger than those in the UK, we found that UK management was able to use its
role of interpreter of the local environment to force some adaptation of global policies,
particularly in the substantive area of diversity management, suggesting that the extent
to which local adaptation occurs is not entirely dependent on the strength of
employment-relations institutions in the host country.
Regarding practical implications, our research points firmly to the limits of global policies.
With their knowledge of the local context subsidiary-level managers can and should have
some freedom to adapt global policies to the local context. At least in Germany they have
an additional role, as they have to manage a complex institutional environment. The
iii
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system of collective bargaining and codetermination fosters collective HR policies that are
often incompatible with the more individualistic global policies pursued by US MNCs.
Nevertheless, as the case studies show, US MNCs are able to manage these institutions in
such a way that the need for adaptation is minimized. This process of institutional
arbitrage tends to be performed by local managers with a deep knowledge of the host
environment.
iv
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1 Introduction
One of the most heated current debates among academics and policy-makers concerns
whether economic globalization is leading to convergence between national systems or
whether different national institutional frameworks are retaining their distinctiveness
and absorbing common challenges in different ways (e.g. Berger and Dore, 1996; Crouch
and Streeck, 1997; Djelic, 1998; Guillén, 2001; Lane, 2000; Ruigrok and van Tulder, 1995;
Sorge, 1996). The role of multinational companies (MNCs) in promoting homogenization
or reinforcing diversity is at the centre of this debate. At one extreme, MNCs are regarded
as footloose, autonomous actors operating in a new global space, independent of any
home country and thus representing the key promoters of globalization and convergence
(Ohmae, 1990). At the other extreme, the notion of the footloose, denationalized
enterprise is regarded as a myth and MNCs are portrayed as being deeply embedded in
their home-country business systems (Hirst and Thompson, 1996; Hu, 1992). Between
these two extremes, there are authors who regard MNCs as being shaped but not
completely determined by their embeddedness in a particular business system: for
example, they highlight the complex processes within MNCs as they seek to reconcile
conflicting influences of home country, host country and supra-national environments
(Ferner et al., 2001; Lane, 2001; Morgan, 2001), their ability to transfer managerial
practices (Mueller, 1994), their ‘constrained’ footlooseness (Dörre, 1997) and their
emulation of ‘best practice’ from ‘dominant’ countries (Smith and Meiksins, 1995).
This report presents the results of a study of the management of human resources in US
MNCs operating in Germany and the UK. The investigation has sought to examine how
US MNCs are influenced by their home-country business system in their HRM policies,
whether HR practices in their German and British operations are distinctly American and
what happens when these practices are implemented in the host-country business systems
of the UK and Germany. Many studies in the field of HRM identify the country of origin
of MNCs as a key factor shaping their behaviour (for a review see Ferner, 1997; Edwards
and Ferner, 2002). Whilst they have been useful in establishing systematic differences in
the ways in which, for example, American, Japanese and European MNCs manage their
human resources, they have been less successful in explaining such differences in
behaviour because of both theoretical and methodological limitations.
In theoretical work there has been a tendency to rely heavily on the cultural-values
approach to provide possible explanations, with Hofstede’s (1980) research being
particularly widely drawn on. Unfortunately, the cultural-values approach is not effective
in respect of the following: clearly identifying which elements of culture shape firms and
their behaviour; pinpointing the underlying differences between national variants of
economic organization; or identifying and explaining how company behaviour changes
over time (Clark et al., 1999; Ferner, 1997; Sondergaard, 1994; Tayeb, 1998).
Methodologically, there has been a tendency to rely on survey-based research methods.
Although useful in providing an overview of broad patterns, they are often too blunt an
instrument to explain such differences or to capture the subtle, complex and changing
ways in which MNCs operate. In seeking to overcome these limitations and to investigate
the complex interaction between US MNCs and the business systems in which they
originate and operate, the investigation which is reported here has taken a modified
1
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version of the institutional approach as its theoretical basis and the in-depth case-study
approach as its research method.
The report is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical approach taken.
Section 3 outlines the research method and briefly describes the case-study companies.
Section 4 provides a detailed discussion and analysis of the behaviour of the four US MNCs
covered by this research in the UK and Germany. Finally, in Section 5 we present our
conclusions, exploring the theoretical and practical implications of the research.
2
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2 The theoretical approach
a) The institutionalist approach
The institutionalist approach has been developed by a number of authors conducting
cross-cultural comparative research. It is in effect a collection of frameworks – under
various headings – which share the view that capitalist economic organization continues
to be influenced by the national institutional frameworks in which it is embedded, thus
producing a variety of alternative and often competing ‘social systems of production’
(Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997), ‘market economies’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001) or ‘business
systems’ (Whitley, 1999). These institutional approaches share a number of common
features in attempting to provide a conceptual framework for the comparative study of
various forms of economic organization. They argue that distinctive forms of economic
organization have become established in particular national contexts through their
interdependent development with dominant macro-level social institutions during and
after industrialization. Thus these approaches reflect a historical dynamic and, whilst
change may occur, its direction is strongly constrained by the mutual interdependence of
forms of economic organization and key institutions. Most importantly, perhaps, these
frameworks represent one of the primary challenges to the argument that the increasing
internationalization of economic activity is necessarily leading to convergence. Whilst
they recognize that internationalization may be leading to greater and more systematic
mutual influence between different national systems, particularly through the borrowing
and diffusion of practices, they argue that this does not necessarily lead to cross-national
uniformity. Rather, they stress, borrowed and diffused practices are themselves integrated
into nationally distinct patterns of economic organization and their implementation may
result in both convergence and continued persistence of national differences.
On the basis of their frameworks, Hall and Soskice (2001) have classified different ideal
types of market economy or business system according to their broad traits,
differentiating between ‘liberal’ and ‘coordinated’ market economies. Essentially, in
liberal market economies, such as the UK or the USA, firms coordinate their activities
primarily through hierarchies and competitive market arrangements; in contrast, in
coordinated market economies, such as Germany, there is greater emphasis on
coordination through non-market mechanisms.
b) HRM in multinational companies and institutionalist
frameworks
In relation to multinational companies and their management of human resources, the
institutional approach outlined above leads to a focus on the ways in which institutions
in the MNC’s home country inform its behaviour internationally (‘country-of-origin
effect’) and the way this behaviour needs to be modified in order to fit the institutional
3
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context of the host countries in which it operates (‘host-country effect’) (see particularly
Ferner, 1997). This requires a ‘sustained, complex and detailed engagement with national
business contexts’ (Ferner, 2000, p. 1). Such an engagement with national business
contexts involves considering the implications of the ‘cohesiveness’ of different national
business systems for the behaviour of their MNCs. For example, it is argued that MNCs
based in a national business system with a relative lack of constraining institutions in the
field of employment relations are less likely to regard their institutional heritage as
something to escape from when operating abroad than MNCs based in strong and
cohesive institutional frameworks which impose a template of regulation for
employment relations. In other words, German firms may be willing to tolerate bodies
such as works councils in their home country, as this is part of a wider system of the
provision of ‘collective goods’ for capital, such as vocational training and wage control.
However, they are unlikely to wish to replicate individual elements of the German system
abroad if these wider institutional supports for the German variety of capitalism are not
in place. Together, these factors can be used to construct a comprehensive foundation
upon which to investigate the ways in which MNCs are informed by their home-country
business systems and whether they attempt to transfer country-of-origin practices or to
escape their institutional heritage when operating abroad.
In terms of the interaction between MNCs and host-country national business systems
(host-country effect), the key issue is the extent to which MNCs reproduce home-country
behaviour abroad or adopt different behaviour. The reproduction of home-country
practices abroad is not an either/or matter. Implementation of a practice at subsidiary
level may take on a variety of forms. For example, country-of-origin practices may be
reshaped in the host-country context into hybrid forms (Boyer et al., 1998; Doeringer et
al., 2003). Moreover, they may lose their original meaning, as highlighted by the
ambiguous use of German-style vocational training in the Spanish subsidiaries of German
MNCs (Dickmann, 1999). In this vein, Kostova (1999) and Saka (2002) distinguish between
the implementation and ‘internalization’ of practices at subsidiary level, the latter
referring to the adoption by employees of the meaning and spirit behind practices rather
than simply their formal nature.
Where MNCs adopt practices different from home-country patterns this can be a
reflection of either ‘forced differentiation’ or ‘differentiation by choice’ (Ferner, 2000).
MNCs may be forced to adopt practices different from home-country patterns where the
institutional distance between home country and host country is great. Therefore, MNCs
may be forced to differentiate practices in host-country environments through the
presence of constraining institutions (e.g., US MNCs operating in much of continental
Europe cannot simply transpose non-union approaches to industrial relations), but
equally where institutional supports for home-country practices are lacking (e.g., German
MNCs may find it difficult to transfer their patterns of work organization to countries
such as the UK, given the lack of a stable system of vocational training in the latter
country). Differentiation by choice can reflect MNCs’ utilization of the flexibility offered
by host-country environments to adopt practices very different from those characteristic
of home-country behaviour, but can also reflect the division of labour between core
domestic operations and peripheral foreign activities.
However, we argue that the conceptualization and analysis of HRM in MNCs cannot be
treated simply as a matter of how strongly home- and host-country institutions influence
HRM practices and that outcomes are not simply a reflection of the balance between
these two sets of influences. Crucially, research needs to avoid reification of the MNC and
4
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examine instead the micro-sociological and political relationships between actors at
different levels within the MNC. Thus, we need to examine not only how actors at
corporate level within MNCs either accept or seek to overcome institutional constraints,
but also how actors at the subsidiary level, whose interests diverge partially from those of
top corporate managers, may seek to fend off, modify or dilute the transfer of practices.
In other words, our conception of the MNC needs to be pluralistic, examining agency
within the context of structure rather than seeking to reach deterministic statements
about either home- or host-country effects.
c) The American business system and the ‘Americanness’
of US MNCs
A comprehensive analysis of the American business system is beyond the scope of this
report. Such an analysis – which served as the initial basis for the current research
programme – can be found in Ferner (2000). Instead, we will briefly outline the major
features of the American business system and suggest how it influences the behaviour of
US MNCs.
A first key feature of the American business system concerns its position in the global
economic order. Since 1945, the USA has occupied a hegemonic position in the global
economy, which has been reinforced by its military and political strength. This has
provided channels, such as the Marshall Plan and trade liberalization, through which an
American model of management could be exported to other countries (Locke, 1996;
Djelic, 1998). It has also meant that the American management model has come to be
regarded as superior and internationally diffused by American business schools,
consulting firms and MNCs.
Secondly, the American business system is a distinct model of economic organization
within the ideal type of ‘liberal market economy’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001). The primary
role of the (national) state, both at federal and State level, is to set a framework for
economic activity within which inter-firm relations and relations between firms and their
workforces are governed largely by contractual market relations, with little input from
business associations. Such arm’s-length contractual relations are reflected in the labour
and financial markets.
Labour markets in the USA are very flexible, imposing few institutional constraints on
labour mobility between firms or the adjustment of workforce size. The major exception
to the lack of government regulation in the American labour market is equal employment
opportunities. Flexible external labour markets have traditionally been combined with
strong internal markets for core workforces in large firms. However, more recent
pressures from international competition and financial markets have led to the decline of
such internal markets, with job tenure becoming increasingly insecure and the use of
temporary and contract work expanding (Ostermann, 1999).
The American financial system is characterized by an absence of close, long-term links
between financial organizations and non-financial firms. Relatedly, equity markets have
become highly developed (O’Sullivan, 2000). Major changes in the financial system in
5
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recent decades, resulting in particular from international competition, a shift of share
ownership to institutions and financial deregulation have led to an aggressive market for
corporate control and a strong shareholder-value ideology. A key consequence of firms’
efforts to increase shareholder value has been the downsizing of workforces (Ferner,
2000).
A third key characteristic of the American business system is the dominance of an
individualistic ideology, which is manifested particularly in employers’ strong anti-state
and anti-union stance. Deep-rooted anti-unionism is matched by trade union weakness
(for a critical analysis of the historical reasons for the weakness of the US trade union
movement, see Colling, 2001). Unionization has traditionally been low and had fallen
from 24 per cent in the 1970s to 14 per cent by 2001 (Mishel et al., 2003). The New Deal
industrial relations system which emerged from the 1935 Labor Relations Act temporarily
strengthened the position of trade unions by establishing legal mechanisms for trade
union recognition. By the mid-part of the twentieth century, employment relations in
many manufacturing firms were underpinned by legally enforceable contracts and highly
codified collective agreements (Kochan et al., 1994) and collective bargaining set wages
for the majority of blue-collar workers in key industries. However, from the 1960s
structural changes and intensified pressures from international competition and financial
markets reduced employers’ need for industrial relations stability and increased their
need for flexibility. Employer support for collective bargaining declined and they
increasingly turned to non-union strategies, relocating operations to greenfield sites
located away from union strongholds, in ‘Right to Work’ states where the New Deal
industrial relations settlement did not fully apply.
Non-unionism has been a continuous feature of industrial relations in the USA, even
during the New Deal era and has taken a variety of forms, ranging from ‘low-road’ to
‘high-road’ variants (Katz and Darbishire, 2000). One high-road variant, referred to by
Jacoby (1997) as ‘welfare capitalism’, is based on the ideology that the firm alone should
provide for the security and welfare of workers without third-party interference and
encourages a strong mutual commitment between the firm and the employee. This
ideology was adopted by many major American companies which, in order to keep unions
at bay, introduced innovative ‘human relations’–style personnel management policies,
including performance-related pay, team working and employee opinion surveys (Jacoby,
1997; Foulkes, 1980). It both influenced and was influenced by the union sector which
looked to welfare capitalism as an alternative template when the New Deal model began
to decline (Ferner, 2000). The welfare capitalism model has itself come under pressure, in
particular from international competition. This has seen many traditional welfare
capitalism companies facing crises and having to reduce radically their workforces, which
in turn has undermined their commitment to employees.
Against the background of these features of the American business system it is a key
premise of our research that US MNCs are likely to transfer aspects of ‘Americanness’ to
their operations abroad. First, the dominant position of the American business system in
the global economic order since 1945, underpinned by channels of influence in other
countries and the notion of American management practices as one-best-way recipes, is
likely to facilitate the export of home-country practices by US MNCs. In turn, resistance on
the part of host countries to the diffusion of American management practices is likely to
be reduced because they perceive an interest in emulating them.
6
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Secondly, the relative lack of institutional regulation in the USA offers firms, at least
superficially, a relatively wide scope for ‘strategic choice’ and is therefore not likely to be
seen by American MNCs as imposing constraints from which they would seek to escape
when operating abroad. Additionally, the competitive advantage of American firms has
largely been based on the establishment of formalized ‘managerial capitalism’ (Chandler,
1990) in order to serve mass domestic markets using early-twentieth-century innovations
such as scientific management and Fordism. It may be expected that American MNCs will
seek to extend this strategy for seeking competitive advantage to foreign subsidiaries.
Thirdly, US MNCs are embedded in a business system dominated by an individualistic
ideology, questioning ‘third-party’ involvement, whether from the state or trade unions.
They are therefore likely to be less tolerant of institutional constraints in host-country
environments than MNCs of other nationalities.
d) Potential varieties of ‘Americanness’ in Germany and
the UK
Although we argue that US MNCs are likely to transfer aspects of their ‘Americanness’
abroad, their ability to transfer country-of-origin practices and the way in which
Americanness is manifested in their foreign subsidiaries is shaped by the nature of host-
country business systems.
The British business system is in many respects institutionally close to the American
business system within the category of ‘liberal market economies’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001).
However, it has not traditionally been characterized by such a strongly individualistic
ideology or anti-union stance on the part of firms as the American business system.
Marked by the absence of legal regulations, employment relations in the UK have
traditionally been contingent on negotiated regulation by the parties involved. The
pluralist industrial relations system resting on joint regulation through collective
bargaining which developed in the UK has, however, been undermined by legal,
economic and political changes in recent years, to be increasingly replaced by unilateral
regulation by employers (Brown et al., 1997; Cully et al., 1999; Dickens and Hall, 1995;
Purcell, 1995).
As a ‘coordinated market economy’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001) the German business system
is more institutionally distant from the American business system. It is much more
institutionally regulated than the USA. In particular, the labour market is highly
regulated, both by statute and by formal agreements negotiated by encompassing actors.
The legal enforceability of collective agreements in Germany has given employers’
associations and trade unions the status of law-creating institutions, able to generate
socially legal norms. The provisions of industry-level collective agreements cover all
employers affiliated to employers’ associations. Moreover, the Works Constitution Act has
the potential to subject all workplaces with more than five employees to uniform
regulation of the employer–employee relationship at plant level. These key institutions of
the German industrial relations system can impinge on the ability of US MNCs to preserve
their managerial prerogative from third-party interference (Muller, 1998). Although the
stability and strength of multi-employer bargaining has been undermined in recent years
7
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by globalization and Reunification, the bulk of the German workforce is still covered.
Nevertheless, the German industrial relations system is in transition. The coverage of
multi-employer bargaining has significantly declined in many industries and is particularly
low in eastern Germany (Kohaut and Schnabel, 2003; Streeck and Rehder, 2003;
Zagelmeyer, 2004). Pay has become more related to individual performance (Bahnmüller,
2002). A longitudinal analysis of data from the Cranet-E survey suggests that over the
1990s there has been a significant increase in the use of performance-related pay in
Germany (Muller-Camen et al., 2004).
Against this background, it can be expected that Americanness is likely to be more
manifest in the institutionally similar system of the UK and less manifest in the
institutionally distant and highly regulated system of Germany. However, informed by the
lack of institutional constraints and the individualistic ideology of their home-country
business system, it can be expected that US MNCs will seek to use all available means to
reduce institutional distance in Germany by avoiding or manipulating institutional
constraints, particularly where they go against their desire to preserve managerial
prerogative from third-party interference, such as from trade unions and employee
representatives. It can be expected that actors at subsidiary level in the UK and Germany
may adopt strategic responses to limit the dual pressures to adopt home-country practices
and to conform to host-country institutions and the expectations of host-country actors.
How these challenges are reconciled in the case-study companies will be considered in
section 4.
8
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3 Methods and the case-study
companies
a) Methods
As has been outlined, the research had three key objectives: (i) to investigate how US
MNCs are informed by their home-country business system in their HRM policies, (ii) to
identify whether HRM practices in their German and British operations are distinctly
American and (iii) to explore what happens to such practices when they are introduced
into the host-country systems of the UK and Germany. In order to fulfil these research
objectives the case-study method was chosen. Whereas surveys have major advantages in
answering ‘how much’ questions, they are less appropriate for assessing both ‘how’ and
‘why’ questions which are of pivotal interest for this study (Yin, 1994). Furthermore,
although survey work is appropriate for identifying broad cross-national differences, it is
less useful for exploring complex chains of causality, such as the ways in which
headquarters direct subsidiary behaviour and actors at subsidiary level modify practices.
Case studies can help ‘the researcher to go deep in complex matters, which are not wholly
understood’ (Stewart et al., 1994, p. 13).
The research was conducted in parallel projects in Germany and the UK, matched by
further projects in Ireland and Spain. Fourteen case studies in a wide range of industries
were carried out in the UK and ten in Germany. This report will discuss four core case-
study companies – two manufacturing and two service companies – in which sufficient
access was granted in both countries. In each of the companies, multiple interviews were
conducted in the German and British subsidiaries and at headquarters level, either in the
USA or, in one case, at European headquarters. Interviews were conducted primarily with
senior HR managers, and with employees and their representatives, but also with key
managers of other relevant functions, such as finance and operations. This research
technique enabled data triangulation. At organizational level it incorporated both the
headquarters’ view ‘from above’ and the subsidiaries’ view ‘from below’. At subsidiary
level it incorporated the perspectives of both management and employees and their
representatives.
The semi-structured interviews were based on interview templates, designed to increase
the comparability of the research, whilst at the same time allowing for adaptation to the
very different institutional frameworks of Germany and the UK. Interviews generally
lasted between one and two hours, although some were much longer. They were tape-
recorded, fully transcribed and some of them were conducted jointly by members of the
UK and German team. Interviews were supplemented with internal company publications
in the form of company newsletters, work agreements and mission statements and with
published data from sources such as annual reports, company websites and practitioner
journals.
9
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b) Case-study companies
The case-study companies have been given pseudonyms as access was granted on
condition of anonymity. Table 1 provides an overview of the case-study companies and
the number of interviews conducted.
The origins of CPGco and its British and German subsidiaries can be traced back to the late
nineteenth century. The business focus is on the development, manufacturing and
marketing of products and services for both consumer and professional markets.
Technologically the business is moving from a relatively stagnant phase to a more
challenging era as a result of the impact of new technology. The company is structured
around a matrix of customer-facing product groups and geographical units, with a
strongly centralized global manufacturing operation. More recently, there have been
moves towards increased centralization within international product groups, of which
there are currently six. The level of European influence on the British and German
subsidiaries varies from business to business. Most of the strategic jobs are located in the
USA, although an Asian subsidiary has assumed a key role in one of the business areas.
The British subsidiary is larger than the German one, which some years ago lost its only
production plant.
Formed in the early twentieth century, ITco operates in the field of IT manufacture and
services. The German subsidiary and the US parent were established at the beginning of
the twentieth century. The UK presence dates back to the 1950s. Structurally, the
company is a matrix of geographic regions and business divisions: the organizational
importance of country operations has decreased sharply. Whilst it enjoyed a high degree
of market dominance in its product market in the past, its position was eroded from the
1980s and 1990s, triggering a financial crisis. This had a major effect on workforce size,
with thousands of redundancies in Germany and the UK. Recent expansion into service
provision has seen global staffing levels rise to a new high. The balance of employment
in both Germany and the UK has reflected these changes, with a dramatically reduced
manufacturing workforce and a rapid increase in employees providing services. In the
German operations, which used to be the company’s largest international operations,
10
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Table 1
The case-study companies
Company pseudonym CPGco ITco Business services Logistico
Sector Manufacturing: Manufacturing Business 
consumer and and servicing consultancy 
professional of IT and technical Logistics 
products equipment services services
Employment – global <100 000 >200 000 <100 000 >200 000
% workforce located 
outside USA 40 50 50 10
% revenues outside USA 50 60 50 20
No. of interviews:
HQ 3 (US) 4 (US) 3 (US) 1 (European HQ)
UK 20 24 2 2
Germany 3 5 4 4
four major production sites were sold. Nevertheless, together with France and the UK, the
German subsidiary is still among the largest in Europe.
Business Services was founded in the 1950s, originally as a partnership, and has only
recently obtained a public listing. It operates with one global brand, providing consulting
and technology outsourcing services to both private and public sector organizations. The
nature of the work gives rise to a group of professional employees who are functionally
and geographically very mobile. The business is structured as a complex matrix. It is
divided into five global market units, which are supported by service lines and overlain
with 15 geographical units. Both the British and German operations were established in
the 1980s. The British operations have grown more rapidly than the German operations
and are seen by German respondents as being five years ahead in terms of development,
client base and headcount. the UK is also an important location of senior management,
with regional (European) and increasingly global functions.
The origins of Logistico can be traced back to the turn of the twentieth century, but it
only began to internationalize in the 1970s. The company is organized into three main
segments: US domestic operations is the principal market segment, complemented by
international operations and business outside its core activity, i.e. supply-chain
management. Logistico has grown rapidly in recent years, particularly through strategic
acquisitions of existing companies. It has sought to build a global brand and this is
increasingly reflected in the centralization of policy, including aspects of HR such as
management training. Logistico Germany is the company’s largest operation outside the
USA. Set up in the 1970s on the model of the company’s US operations, it was one of the
first international locations and the oldest European subsidiary. More than half of the
company’s European employees are located in Germany and many managers at European
level are German nationals. Although there is a small European headquarters, this is
regarded by German respondents are being less significant than the German
headquarters. Logistico UK was formed in the early 1990s as a combination of greenfield
operations and acquisitions.
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4 Key issues in HRM in US MNCs in
the UK and Germany
Rather than attempting to present a descriptive summary of HR policy across the board in
the case-study companies, this section presents more detailed findings on four specific
issues that have emerged as key elements in the management of international HRM. The
first – the balance between centralization and decentralization – is crucial to an
understanding of the mechanisms whereby domestic US influences and policies are
transferred to the subsidiary. The remaining three are substantive issues which are
strongly ‘embedded’ within the assumptions and institutions of the American business
system: the attitude to collective employee representation, the pay and performance
management system and the emphasis on employee diversity. An examination of these
issues allows the exploration of underlying country-of-origin influences, international
policy transfer and adaptation to the host environment.
a) Centralization, standardization and formalization
A plethora of studies has demonstrated that US MNCs are more centralized than those of
other nationalities in the way they manage their international workforces and that they
rely on the use of standardized and formal policies to achieve this (for a review, see Ferner
et al., 2004). Headquarters play an important role in setting or influencing policy on
payment systems, industrial relations, communication and training policies (see e.g.
Dunning, 1998; Harzing, 1999; Muller, 1998). Thus there appears to be a characteristic
modus operandi in US companies that is likely to lead to a strong American influence over
the formation of international policies in substantive areas of employment relations. In
this section we first examine the balance between centralization and decentralization in
our sample firms; then we analyse the extent to which they are able to transfer central
policies and the influence subsidiaries have on this.
The balance between centralization and decentralization
Our study to a large extent confirms the findings of earlier research. In the four sample
firms, as well as in each of the national studies more generally (for a more detailed
account of all case studies conducted in Germany and the UK, see Wächter et al., 2003,
and Almond et al., 2003, respectively), there was considerable centralization of policy,
either at corporate level or within international product divisions.
The extent of central direction varied with the company and the issue. Policies on pay and
appraisal for senior staff tended to be highly prescribed, with local managers being
accorded relatively little room for manoeuvre in the way these operated. In contrast,
subsidiaries generally had more freedom to manage non-managerial employees. For
example, formal global performance appraisal systems often stopped at the level of first-
line management and central policy laid down only a general framework which
subsidiaries were free to adapt to local circumstances. Even for non-managerial
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employees, however, there were many highly prescribed policies, such as the sophisticated
time measurement system for standard manual activities in Logistico that is used
worldwide. In general, rather than following global standards, these centralized policies
were extensions of domestic US policies. As we have argued elsewhere, this can be traced
back to features of the American business system, particularly to the management
systems that companies developed to manage geographically dispersed units deploying
standardized mass production technologies (Ferner et al., 2004).
Rather than following global standards, centralized policies generally build on domestic
US policies. The only exception appears to be Business Services, where a backlash by
European partners against ethnocentric US policies and the election of a new CEO seem
to have led to the development of a geocentric approach. According to a German
Business Services manager ‘there are now no project teams which are made up solely of
Americans and in which people from Europe and Asia are not involved’. Ideas developed
in one region will be piloted in another to ensure that they can be globally adopted, as
described by one of their US managers:
Ideas that start in the US go to Europe to see if they work in one of the European
countries, because it’s very hard to sell an American idea to the Continental Europeans
unless you can prove that it’s working there and that you’ve got sponsors on the
Continent. The same is true in reverse that if a good idea arises really anywhere in
Europe, UK or on the Continent, it’s very hard to get the Americans to buy into it until
there is some proof that it can be scaled to the US. (US HR manager, Business Services)
British and German respondents in all four sample firms suggested that in recent years HR
policies have become more standardized. A senior German CPGco HR manager
summarized this trend as follows: ‘In the past we had one meeting per year. Information
was more or less exchanged but that was it. Now everyone is assigned tasks. These tasks
are pre-set centrally and the possibility for the countries to tailor something according to
local needs is all but non-existent.’ However, this picture has to be qualified. ITco, for
example, had moved away from a highly centralized global approach in the 1980s, and
granted more power to the country subsidiaries in order to encourage greater flexibility
and innovation. Financial crisis led to recentralization in the 1990s, but this was to the
level of regional and business division headquarters rather than to the corporate centre.
Similar to other functions the region has become the predominant level in most areas of
HR policy. National HR directors no longer have the influential positions they once did,
although there was some variation in this respect. For example, compared with his UK
counterpart, the German HR Director continued to play a key role in operating the
complex and highly regulated German IR system (see Box 1). Alongside this, there has
been a marked reduction in HR staff at national levels, particularly due to the
introduction of a telephone-based service centre dealing with basic HR-related enquiries
from across Europe (Almond et al., 2004).
Similar processes are to be found, albeit somewhat less dramatic, in the other three firms,
with European integration strengthening the importance of the European regional level
in the implementation of MNCs’ HR policies, implying both a recentralization away from
national level and a relaxation of detailed control from corporate headquarters. However,
European headquarters seems to be more important at ITco and CPGco than at Business
Services and Logistico. There is not always a clear distinction between management levels,
though in several companies parts of the regional organization were physically located in
subsidiaries rather than at separate regional head offices, often resulting in regional and
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subsidiary HR managers being in offices next door to one another. Within the region, key
roles were sometimes performed by American expatriates, who had come from, and
would return to, domestic operations and who retained close links with their home base.
Hence, this emerging management level can be seen as something of a ‘battleground’, as
the regional headquarters are staffed partly with Americans with close ties to the
corporate headquarters and partly by those promoted from the operating units who
retain close alliances with those in the subsidiaries.
The growing role of business divisions has muddied the waters even further. These
structures play an important part in integrating productive activity across borders in
Business Services, CPGco and ITco, encouraging the devolution of HR issues from
corporate headquarters to business divisions and simultaneously a reduced role for the
national subsidiary level. Sometimes these structural principles are in tension. For
example, the logic of the global product structure may conflict with cost-saving drives
that require greater cross-business coordination of HR to avoid unnecessary duplication.
This was manifested at ITco in the concept of ‘shared HR services’ and in cross-national HR
‘call centres’ to provide specialist HR advice on a regionally centralized basis.
Transmission mechanisms and politics
The second principal factor that complicated the nature of central control was that while
former systems and procedures were important, as argued above, these were
complemented by informal networks and personal relations. Formal guidelines, which are
still very important at Logistico, seem to have become less valid in the other three firms.
According to a German CPGco manager, downsizing left too few headquarters employees
to update and re-adjust such guidelines. ‘We do have world-wide guidelines but if you
were to stick to them you could stop working. … Then we had to lay off people
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Box 1
The changing roles of HR in the region and in national subsidiaries in ITco
In the last few years, HR processes have been concentrated at regional level. Regional
managers in areas like remuneration or employee resourcing now set the objectives
of their functional counterparts in the country subsidiaries. The national HR
managers’ role is primarily to implement policy within the legal and IR constraints set
by the national environment; they have therefore lost power and influence within the
wider corporation:
The role of the HR director in the country has very much changed, probably five
or six years ago they were much more empowered to do their strategies, to
determine their own salary policies, now this is decided by the process leader
sitting in [European headquarters]. … We have dramatically reorganized, and I
deliberately used the word ‘dramatically’ because many of our managers could
not cope with this change of roles and among us I would say, yes, maybe two-
thirds, even more, have been exchanged. There are people who could cope with
this change and the new requirements, … the majority of our country HR leaders
in [the European region] are not here anymore, they could not cope. (Regional HR
manager, ITco)
everywhere and there was nobody who continued to work on those questions.’ In
contrast to written guidelines, control by reporting has seemed to gain in importance
with the growing use of IT. For example, at CPGco, a new, potentially decisive change with
regard to reporting is the worldwide introduction of the SAP R3 system. This will make a
wide range of data, which are currently held in the different countries, available to
central management. This might reduce the amount of reporting requirements, but
numerous comparisons and benchmarking analyses can, and will, be done. This will
increase the need to find explanations for deviations which, according to the finance
manager interviewed, may often be impossible. Business Services, CPGco and ITco also
have a global HR information system. At Business Services this includes data on employee
CVs, working hours spent by each project and consultant, results of attitude surveys,
training costs and pay roll.
Formal processes and hierarchical authority in the sample firms were supported by a
significant expatriate presence in senior management positions at the subsidiaries or the
regional level. These individuals could tap into global interpersonal networks that
smoothed the operations of formal systems and blurred the rigid distinction between
central authority and subsidiary autonomy. At Business Services new HR instruments are
often developed by international teams.
The significance of these two factors – the growing importance of regional structures and
business units, and the reliance on informal networking to complement formal policies –
is that they allowed some scope for organizational actors below the corporate
headquarters level to challenge the role of the centre. Accordingly, in the case studies
there was a constant interplay of interests at different levels within the MNC. This meant
that the precise degree of centralization was not a given, imposed by the corporate
leadership in response to objective structural factors, but rather was subject to
negotiation between actors with control over various kinds of resources. The relative
power of subsidiary actors to contest the balance between centralization and autonomy
was being enhanced by such objective changes as the increasing proportion of company
operations outside the home country (e.g. Business Services), the existence of important
specialist competences in foreign operations as a result of mergers and acquisitions and
the need to devolve strategic responsibilities to subsidiaries so that they could better
serve distinctive regional markets.
One consequence of this was that there was negotiation over both policy formulation and
implementation. Subsidiaries were sometimes able to win a role in policy creation, even
where policy was centralized and standardized. This was particularly true of companies
that had been internationalized for a long time, and where the subsidiaries had a strong
position within the wider company. One upshot was the growing importance of cross-
border ‘virtual’ networks and working groups, sometimes with a policy development role,
using techniques such as e-mail and video-conferencing. Virtual meetings have become
much more common in order to reduce travel costs and the use of conference calls has
increased networking. One consequence of this informal networking was that some HR
initiatives that became global policies were modelled on policies from outside the USA.
For example, in Business Services the German subsidiary developed a leadership
development course for younger, more inexperienced people coming into partnership
roles.
In Germany, they’ve piloted their own leadership development course which went
down very well. … Those ideas were then developed and we now have a global
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leadership development programme. Now to that extent, I think we really developed
on that idea and invested a lot of additional time, effort and energy, and they have
[Headquarter HR Director] come in and helped shape that programme, but it was a
germ of an idea that started in Germany. (British global HR manager, Business Services)
Of course, the mere existence of international teams did not guarantee non-headquarters
managers a say in policy development. A prime example of this was at ITco where one
European manager described the operation of international teams as dominated by US
managers (See Box 2).
While local managers had only a limited role in shaping policy formation, subsidiary
actors had rather more de facto power to challenge or resist central control when it came
to policy implementation. Most obviously, they had considerable scope to interpret
policies in the light of local conditions. One lever for local managers was the existence of
host-country institutions, allowing them to resist standardization by arguing that global
or regional policy had to be modified to fit local circumstances. For instance, within the
German employment system, initial vocational training is of paramount importance. As
budgets have become more important than headcounts in HR planning, ITco Germany has
to justify this investment in terms of profitability and cost. One way to do this is to sell it
as a local way to achieve the corporation’s aim of building a highly qualified workforce.
This is particularly the case, as we discuss in more detail below, with regard to collective
representation. More generally, there was some ambiguity concerning the extent to
which host-country institutions actually did represent binding constraints on local
management. For example, at ITco a European manager was trying to introduce a
regional web-based recruitment tool, which met with resistance from German
management. Her problem was in understanding the extent to which this was due to
legal constraints:
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Box 2
Policy Development and International Teams
I am, of course, part of the global team and we have regular exchanges, but just
to show you a practical example, when we meet on a global level in New York, for
example, you will find one representative, that is me, from Europe, my
counterpart from Asia, and then you will find 18 Americans in the room! [laughs]
Just to show you the proportion and of course we will try to [have] some influence
here; they are all very polite to us, it’s very open, but at the end of the day they
will more or less … , from their understanding they will ask us what they have
developed, how and if we can roll that out in our geography and maybe there’s a
preliminary step that they inform us that they intend to do something, but usually
they are very much US-centred, okay. And then they just, they just implement
these things in our geography, so to be very honest its not a real global team;
where we say okay this is a global company let’s have equal representation, sit
down at a round table and decide what to do here, to cater [to] the needs of the
countries outside of the US, we are very much dominated for our support by the
US needs and then we have to see how we can live with it or how we can adapt
it here. (regional HR manager, ITco)
And I was speaking to my boss about it this week and he said we’ll just go there and
we’ll just sit down in front of the HR leaders and tell them. But you see I don’t want
to do that until I’ve really investigated the implications of some of these changes. …
Germany doesn’t record ethnic [data], but the works council might look at that and
think there’s something a bit secret going on here. I know it sounds a bit odd but if
you think that if you want to find fault in something and that’s what the works council
by and large want to do, they want to protect the nationalism [sic], so as soon you say
there’s something European, the works council try to sort of really critique it, then I
want to eliminate possibilities where the works council might get a bit twitched.
(European HR manager, ITco)
Conclusions
The centralized pattern of HR policy in our case studies confirms the findings of other
studies of US MNCs and we argue that this can be traced back to features of the US
business system which fosters the development of standard policies across different
business and geographic operations. With the exception of Business Services, centralized
policies usually build on domestic policies, supporting the notion that US MNCs are
relatively ethnocentric. In recent years HR policies seem to have become even more
standardized. The growth of European integration has to some extent strengthened the
role of the region at the expense of both national subsidiary and corporate headquarters,
but a parallel dynamic has seen the region lose out to increasingly important
international product divisions or business units.
Although all sample firms have elaborate bureaucratic, personnel and social control
systems, subsidiaries can to some extent ‘negotiate’ the extent of their autonomy. This
reflects the fact that subsidiaries have specific power resources that they can leverage.
First, the general balance is shifting in their favour as an increasing proportion of
operations in US MNCs are located outside the USA. Secondly, subsidiaries are located in
‘national business systems’ with their own institutional arrangements, including laws and
customary behaviour which subsidiary managers are in a good position to ‘interpret’ to
head office. This gives them scope to resist some central initiatives on the grounds they
are incompatible with the institutional framework. Given that the German institutional
environment is much stronger than the British, this seems to apply in particular to the
German subsidiaries. Thirdly, subsidiary managers are often ‘co-opted’ into the
international HR policy process by virtue of having HR responsibilities above national
level, usually within the region. Finally, international policy-making teams, which are
often virtual, provide subsidiary managers with opportunities to influence global policies.
Turning from the processual issue ‘centralization of decision-making’ we now discuss each
of the three substantive issues.
b) Collective representation and participation
When discussing the US business system earlier we pointed out that US industrial relations
are characterized by deep-rooted anti-unionism and trade union weakness. We also
pointed to the importance of ‘welfare capitalism’. This is characterized by sophisticated,
often ‘paternalist’ employment policies that seek to instil in employees a commitment to
the goals of the organization and in turn offer them long-term employment and
attractive material rewards. Even though some of the defining features, such as high pay
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and relative job security, may have weakened in recent years, the heritage of welfare
capitalism is still strong in at least two of our four firms. CPGco and ITco have traditionally
been two of the main ‘welfare capitalist’ companies in the USA. Business Services is
overwhelmingly non-union in its US operations. Among our case-study firms only
Logistico has recognized trade unions and high union density in the USA.
It is often argued that the strength of hostility to trade unions on the part of American
managers is distinctive (Edwards, 1986; Hollingsworth, 1997), and that this influences the
management style of US MNCs abroad (Innes and Morris, 1995; Muller, 1998). In this
section we therefore first discuss the extent to which trade unions are recognized in the
German and UK subsidiaries and whether this is influenced by US headquarters. As
institutional pressures for collective representation and participation are particularly
strong in Germany, we then analyse the extent to which this leads to the adaptation of
global policies.
Collective representation in the UK and Germany
The open and deregulated nature of the British business system means that there are few
constraints on the transfer of a non-union, ‘pro-individual’ model of employment
relations by US MNCs. Consequently, US MNCs in the UK have a lower propensity to
recognize unions than non-US firms. In contrast, the German business system places
severe constraints on the transfer of a unitarist US-type HRM model (Muller, 1999).
Nevertheless, some US MNCs manage to avoid the labour-market institutions of collective
bargaining and codetermination (Muller, 1998). Furthermore, in both countries they try
to minimize union influence where they cannot avoid it (e.g. Royle, 2000). However, non-
unionism in US subsidiaries in the UK and elsewhere has not generally been explored in
relation to the kind of sophisticated ‘union substitution’ policies that emerged in welfare
capitalist firms in the USA (with exceptions, e.g. Beaumont and Townley, 1985; Muller,
1998).
The case studies presented a mixed picture of the actual practice of union recognition in
the UK. Business Services has not recognized any trade unions, and whilst Logistico is
highly unionized in its domestic operations it recommends that potential union expansion
should be kept to a minimum, although this does not amount to an anti-union directive.
At Logistico UK, a trade union agreement covers about one third of operations and was
inherited in the rapid period of acquisitions and maintained since then.
CPGco, fiercely protective of its non-union status in the USA, had recognized unions in its
UK manufacturing plants for decades following a union campaign in the 1970s. These
contrasting approaches to trade unions in the USA and the UK came about at a time when
CPGco’s operations were very much centred in the USA and the company was marked by
a relatively low degree of global integration of production and product markets. The
focus of attention in terms of retaining its non-union status was therefore directed much
more heavily towards domestic operations than foreign subsidiaries. Since union
recognition in the 1970s, UK management has become heavily involved in bargaining and
consultation with a strong shop steward organization. Having developed skills in working
with unions and a good working relationship, subsidiary management saw no reason to
change its policy radically when the company began to integrate its production
operations on a global scale.
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The case of ITco is worth mentioning, as the need to enter the outsourcing market had
the potential to challenge the subsidiary’s non-union ethos. This is because the operations
ITco has taken over have often had high union membership:
ITco UK is intent on staying non-union [but] what has happened of course since
they’ve brought people in from other companies [is that] they’ve brought in trade
unions, and they’ve been willing to do that. Now that would not have happened,
certainly it could never have happened easily ... [in the past]. The company believed ...
that people couldn’t get a better deal with trade unions .... It didn’t really want to
encourage an independent force. Then suddenly this gets pushed to one side by
market conditions, because it would be quite difficult to service a number of
companies unless you took in their labour force, and their labour force was already
trade unionized anyway. (UK manager, ITco)
However, ITco UK has come down very heavily on any moves towards union recognition
(Tempel et al., 2004).
In contrast to the UK operations, employee representation and participation is much
stronger in the German subsidiaries. All four sample firms have works councils. However,
at Business Services this covers only support staff, and not consultants, who constitute
about 80 per cent of employees. This is due not only to the nature of the consultant
workforce, which is university educated, highly career oriented and occupationally
mobile, but also, as pointed out by a German HR manager, to sophisticated HR policies:
We have [“]best place to work[”] initiatives. We strive to be an employer who is
attractive [so] that consultants want to join us and stay with us. And that is more than
any works council could offer. When the company, all the HR people and all the senior
managers are daily putting a lot of effort into finding ways to make this an attractive
place to work, then they are doing exactly the same as what a works council would
do.
In all four US firms decisions on employee representation policy were devolved, but they
were taken within a framework of assumptions significantly influenced by US concerns
about unions. In the sample firms there was a clearly understood (although often
unspoken) corporate strategy of avoiding unions where host contexts permitted it. A
senior headquarters HR manager of CPGco made this point explicitly:
Our corporate position is that we believe it’s better for the company and better for
employees to be able to deal directly. So you take that as an overall position. Given
that, we recognize that in a lot of countries in the world the tradition is to have some
other sort of representation for employees.
At Logistico Germany we were told by management that when the first works councils
were set up in the late 1980s there was a certain amount of irritation on the part of
company headquarters in the USA and questions were asked about what a works council
is and why it needs to be informed of matters like new pay systems and working time.
According to the works council member interviewed, there were rumours among
management that ‘if a works council had been set up, then management had failed in the
eyes of the Americans … failed meaning that was the end of your career’. A similar view
emerged from an interview with a Logistico HR manager:
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Works councils are set up if employees want them, if they hope for some advantages
by having a works council. If communication between management and employees is
good, which is fundamental, there are usually no advantages. Normally, the reason
why employees want to set up works councils is because of management mistakes. If
a works council is set up, we must ask ourselves what we have done wrong. We can’t
prevent them. But it is better to be aware of problems before things get that far and
to try to solve them through communication.
Despite this strategic preference for non-union operations and despite the sometimes
fervently anti-union opinions of headquarters managers and US expatriates, little
attempt was made to impose policies on subsidiaries. British and German managers
generally reported little direct pressure from the USA to adopt particular policies on
employee relations issues. As a UK respondent at CPGco argued, the US company has ‘a
tremendous fear of unions [but] they do not try and impose it elsewhere’. Nevertheless,
there appears to be a difference in attitudes because the unions in the German subsidiary
have more impact on the firm’s desired HR policies than in the UK.
Logistico is again the most striking example. Although today there generally seems to be
a cooperative relationship between management and works councils, management
strongly opposed the initial establishment of these bodies. The works council member
interviewed was involved in calling the first works meeting (Betriebsversammlung) which
according to the Works Constitution Act can take place during working time without loss
of pay. He received a letter from a law firm initiated by Logistico’s German labour
relations department threatening him with a 500,000 DM fine or imprisonment if the
works meeting took place. At that time, he was quite inexperienced but consulted a
lawyer, who advised him that this threat was not legal. Eventually the works meeting
took place with busloads of employees from all over Germany coming to attend. This
incident echoes Royle’s (1998) observation of McDonalds’ hard-line avoidance strategies
in Germany.
Nevertheless, as this example also shows, at least in Germany the scope for avoidance
strategies is limited and thus US MNCs have to work with the system. As a senior German
ITco manager suggested, ‘HR and codetermination policy here, and this is an advantage
which we have, is not done in a dogmatic way but is solution-oriented. We consider not
only the necessities of the business but also employee interests and we try to come to an
agreement which is reasonable for both sides.’ A similar assessment was made by a
Logistico works council member: ‘[Logistico] has now realized the advantages of having a
works council, at least in our case. In the past, the attitude was that anyone who criticized
[Logistico] was inherently bad. Now they have realized that criticism can be positive and
that people are willing to contribute.’
Today, Logistico, instead of opposing works councils, uses the system to its own
advantage. In contrast to local works councils, which are often critical of management,
the group works council at the company level is dominated by supervisors and other
managerial staff:
The attitude of management was that if a group works council is to be set up, then
we want to shape it … They try, unofficially of course, to influence the election
propaganda and election strategy in such a way that people who support their views
are elected. The group works council is controlled by [Logistico]. Some of its members
have been trained in America. They have been very well trained and receive a lot of
support. (German works council member, Logistico)
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Such a calculating, pragmatic approach could also be observed in the UK subsidiaries. At
ITco, Logistico and CPGco, where unions existed, relations with them were generally
peaceable and sometimes harmonious, and there were few instances of current conflict.
As one would have expected, at least in theory, German labour-market institutions
provide a potentially stronger barrier for the global standardization of HR policies than
UK institutions. We observed this in all of the German subsidiaries with the exception of
Business Services. One example concerns redundancies, in relation to which the law gives
employee representatives a relatively strong position to delay downsizing and to
encourage firms to rely on early retirement and voluntary redundancies rather than
dismissals. This was reported not only at CPGco, but also at ITco, where a workforce
reduction of 40 per cent in the early 1990s was achieved without compulsory
redundancies. As with other companies in Germany, voluntary early retirement and
redeployment was the preferred method, supported by the works council. As budgets
were more important than headcount at ITco, an unpaid increase in weekly working
hours as a result of a new company collective bargaining agreement was used by German
managers to argue that half the labour cost reduction requested had already been
achieved. According to the HR manager and the works council member interviewed, ITco
Germany still follows an employment-security policy. The main change as compared with
the past is that a specific job position is no longer guaranteed. Various training
programmes and initiatives have been deployed to increase the long-run flexibility of
employees, alongside a clause in the company collective agreement which grants
employees the right to training. As a result of redeployment combined with natural
wastage, ITco did not have to dismiss employees in the latest round of cost savings. In
contrast, UK managers indicated that the firm’s previous policy of employment security is
no longer in place.
In the past, the relationship between management and works council in CPGco’s German
subsidiary was often highly conflictual, particularly in the manufacturing sites. As a result,
central initiatives could not be implemented in Germany, or only with substantial delay.
‘We stuck out like a sore thumb often enough because of all the policies which the works
councils prevented from being implemented. The rest of the world had no problems, but
we had to report [implementation] problems’ (CPGco HR manager). This applied to
production in particular, where, for example, teamwork could not be implemented due
to works council resistance. At the time of our interviews the works council was trying to
limit working hours, to protect the use of German data for the global SAP R/3 system and
to regulate merit increases. Turning to Logistico, one of the UK managers interviewed
suggested that works councils make the German operations less flexible and prevent the
introduction of some practices that have been implemented without any problems in the
UK. Thus there was some evidence of actors in Germany successfully negotiating
compromises to corporate influences.
However, at Logistico we also observed that works councils, instead of opposing global
policies, can also foster their adoption. Logistico USA has a two-week induction training
programme for new drivers. In the plant of the interviewed works council member, this
induction training has been regulated by a works agreement. According to him,
‘[Logistico USA] has an induction training programme for new employees, which is very
good ... We copied the American training programme in the form of a works agreement.
They [management] couldn’t object. It would have been embarrassing for them if they
had said “no, we don’t agree to that” ’. The works council is now campaigning for the
induction training to be extended because the job of driver has become much more
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complicated due to the greater use of information technology and more extensive initial
on-the-job training would be a way of reducing the high turnover rate amongst new
employees. In contrast, in the UK the induction training programme was an example of a
global policy which local management ‘cherry picked’: ‘The way we train our drivers is
based on the way that the States train their drivers, but we took the initiative locally in
the UK to do that … we stole, if you like, the US programme and anglicized it and
implemented it because we could see the benefits of it. We told region [Europe] that we
were doing it and we suggested to them that they should try and promote it in other
countries’.
The previous examples have shown the impact of codetermination: subsidiary
management must justify something and present a business case. According to a CPGco
HR manager, ‘The works council requires management to be good. We have often had US
visitors and have said: “If one is required to present an issue to the works council one has
to think it through twice and then it gets automatically better”’. Using a similar
argument, a HR manager at ITco told us: ‘One advantage of codetermination is certainly
that issues are being discussed intensively and you give it quite some thought before
putting it into practice. Sometimes it takes more time before you implement it, but if you
put it into practice it works better.’ Similarly, a works council member pointed out: ‘When
the Americans come over and discuss codetermination with me, then they are all
enthusiastic. Because codetermination means co-designing and co-responsibility and it is
therefore not only a one-way street.’ As Box 3 illustrates, this is not a new phenomenon.
Nevertheless, codetermination means that it is more difficult for German management to
comply with central initiatives. According to a CPGco HR manager, ‘Management is under
strong pressure – because there is an expectation that codetermination does not cause
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Box 3
Board level codetermination
The German advisory board changed its shape in the early 80s and, wait for it, two
union members had to take their place on the supervisory board, two union
members had become members of it. These were outsiders, by the way, not ITco
employees, two outsiders … two union officers had to become members, and the
Germans were worried about that …. but they certainly would have briefed
[European headquarters] and [European headquarters] would certainly brief to
the States and the States would be watching with considerable interest. Well,
whether this was German propaganda or what, I don’t know, but the story of the
first meeting is, they all assemble and the first item on the agenda is actually the
results of ITco in Germany …. And the results were not very good, which is unusual
for ITco Germany, which is pretty successful. So this is shown, a presentation takes
place, the results aren’t very good, and the union, one of the union officers says I
would like to make a point. Everybody looks a bit sort of cowering! He says that
‘you understand that this is not acceptable, the results must be better!’ [laughs]
There was a sort of air of relaxation over the meeting. This is their story – and they
all realize that actually the union members have the same interests and actually
are quite interested to help them get better results, not actually get on the
defensive. (Retired UK manager, ITco)
any delays. “This is your task, these are the targets and at the end of the year you have
to be at this point”.’ Similarly, the German HR manager interviewed at ITco suggested
that codetermination is generally not accepted as a reason for non-compliance by
headquarters:
This does not mean that it is accepted, that we go our special national way just
because of that fact and have an easy life. [Headquarters] still expect that we
implement our agenda even under these exacerbated general conditions. In other
words: codetermination is no excuse for not achieving our goals. We just have to
implement it in an adequate manner. Maybe this might take a little longer.
Employee representatives also feel this pressure, as management has threatened to
transfer jobs abroad (CPGco, ITco) or to subcontractors (Logistico) in order to enforce
compliance. At CPGco we were told that the difficulties caused by employee
representatives have created a bias in the US headquarters which has made it difficult for
the German subsidiary to attract investment. At Logistico two plants were outsourced to
subcontractors because works councils had been set up. Employee representatives at ITco
also pointed out that centralization within the corporation makes life more difficult for
them:
It has changed insofar [as] we bargained directly with the German management more
often in the past, whereas today it has to be synchronized at least with [European
headquarters] or even with [corporate headquarters] to bring harmonization effects
... into accordance with these national requirements. Our work has become more
difficult. In the past we had sufficient time for discussion. This has been shortened
drastically because in many countries managerial decisions can be executed directly
and do not have to be negotiated with the works council. (German works councillor,
ITco)
Conclusions
The impact of the home country shows up in the area of employee representation. The
American roots of the sample firms are evident through a strong preference for union
avoidance wherever possible. While this does not take the form of a formal central policy,
the parent company’s wishes are communicated unambiguously to managers in both
countries. Anti-unionism shaped the perceptions and frames of reference of German and
UK managers. Generally, however, parental anti-unionism was felt only in a diluted form
in the subsidiaries, where it was interpreted in a moderate, pragmatic manner and
harnessed to local managements’ own agenda. ITco and Business Services were
committed to non-unionism in the UK, but in those subsidiaries where unions existed, as
long as British managerial pragmatism delivered the goods, there appeared to be little
overt pressure for a more proactive anti-union stance in the subsidiaries. However, one
reason for this may be the lower impact even recognized trade unions have in the UK. As
the German cases suggest, works councils can force firms to adapt global policies or can
at least delay their implementation. This can create friction with European or US
headquarters.
German management seems to react in four different ways. First, where works councils
do not yet exist, their establishment is avoided. Secondly, local management exerts
pressure on employee representatives not to delay or block global policies by threatening
to shift employment abroad. Thirdly, it tries to foster the election of employer-friendly
works councils. Fourthly, as works councils cannot be decertified, German managers not
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only have to manage them effectively, but also to communicate their benefits to a higher
level. To European and US headquarters a business case for codetermination is made, to
the effect that, although employee representatives may delay implementation initially it
will be facilitated later.
c) Pay and performance
American MNCs have a long history of innovation in the area of pay and performance
management in Germany and the UK. This includes early moves towards performance-
related pay, the use of salary surveys and various forms of profit sharing. The use of such
practices can be traced back to the ‘free market’ individualistic assumptions of the
employment relationship in the USA and the relative freedom of US (non-union) firms to
experiment with pay policies.
The management of pay and performance is perhaps the HR area in which worldwide
policies and guidelines are most widespread in the case-study firms. Even where
subsidiary managers have relatively wide autonomy in other areas, grading systems and
the management of both collective and individual performance-related pay and bonuses
appear to be tightly controlled by headquarters. One reason frequently given for this is
the increasingly globalized nature of internal labour markets within the companies. As a
result of the greater number of contacts between employees in different countries, cross-
national variation becomes more obvious. Apart from the dissatisfaction this may cause
among employees, it is seen as necessary to have global grading and performance
management systems in order to permit the proper functioning of international internal
labour markets for managers and those with high-level technical skills. Furthermore,
systems of performance control adopted by MNCs provide a powerful mechanism with
which to monitor and control foreign operations (Marginson and Sisson, 1996). In some
cases they also enable corporate management to persuade local workforces to accept
changes in HR practices through the reward of future investment or the threat of
divestment (See, for example, Mueller and Purcell, 1992; Muller-Camen et al., 2001).
Given the tight control and standardization in this area, tension between the pressures
for uniformity and host-country autonomy can be expected. Therefore the extent to
which global policies have to be adapted in the British and German subsidiaries may vary:
the German system of collective bargaining in particular (Muller, 1997) could present an
obstacle for the introduction of global practices. Although all four sample firms
emphasize performance-related pay, there is great variety in wage determination and
performance appraisal. Therefore we analyse each company separately.
Adaptations to Itco’s global pay system
ITco changed its pay system radically in the mid-1990s. Until then the corporation relied
on a very detailed and inflexible single point factor system that was administered by
compensation managers. This included over 5,000 positions that were allocated to 24
salary grades. The new system was based on just three factors (skills, leadership
requirement and job scope) and ten broad bands. Line managers and not HR specialists
have been responsible since then for assigning their employees to the bands. As required
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by law, there is some works council involvement in the allocation of individuals to bands
in the German subsidiary.
The grading system is linked to a system of performance appraisal. This was introduced at
the same time, is uniform globally for all employees, and based on performance against
agreed objectives under a number of broad measurements, namely how the individual
contributes to ITco’s overall strategies, how the individual performs relative to defined
goals and how the team or group engages to achieve the goals or strategy. In terms of
pay determination, the system is based on a forced distribution with defined percentages
of the payroll increase for each category of performer. Managers are ‘actively required’
to place only 10 to 15 per cent of their subordinates in the highest category ‘A’, 60 to 70
per cent in ‘B’, 10 to 28 per cent in ‘C’ and 2 to 5 per cent in ‘D’. The highest performers
receive one-and-a-half times to twice the average salary increase, B employees the
average, those in category C 0.6 times the average and those in ‘D’ do not receive any
increase. Finally, a variable pay element of 10 per cent is part of the system. The size of
variable pay funds depends on Itco’s performance. If the targets set by the company are
100% achieved, the employees get on average a bonus of 10 per cent. Individual bonuses
are directly linked to the forced distribution appraisal explained above: for example, an
employee with the highest rating receives two-and-a-half times the bonus of an
employee with a low rating.
The pay system was developed at the European level in 1992/1993 and then in 1994/1995
was adapted by the corporation. In turn, the grading system of the European proposal
was very much influenced by the German subsidiary, which at that time was negotiating
an innovative company agreement (see below). The German subsidiary had partly
abolished the analytical job evaluation system foreseen by industry-wide collective
bargaining (with the agreement of the collective bargaining parties) for some employees
as early as the 1970s. It had also introduced a three per cent variable pay element. In the
UK, variable pay has been in operation since the 1960s and the British subsidiaries’
Management by Objectives system served as the basis for the performance-related
element of ITco’s new global pay system. According to one German HR manager, ITco
Germany was the first European subsidiary to introduce the new global system. Although
the pay system is a worldwide standardized tool, differences do exist: for example, not all
European subsidiaries have variable pay and not in all is it 10 per cent.
Most German employees are still covered by multi-employer collective bargaining which
basically guarantees employees a high sectoral minimum wage (Muller, 1997). If a firm is
covered, it is not normally possible to apply a performance-related pay system such as
ITco’s. Until the early 1990s, ITco was part of the metalworking industry collective
agreement and thus had to deal with the most powerful German union, IG Metall.
However, ITco used the reorganization of its German operations into several legally
independent firms in 1993 to leave the metalworking employers’ association, apart from
for its production sites. Although the main reason for this move was the introduction of
the 35-hour working week in this industry, pay inflexibility was also a factor. According to
the managing director of the German operations at that time, 90 per cent of annual
increases were determined by the industry-wide agreement and only 10 per cent was left
for individual incentives. Works council members forced management to negotiate a
company-level agreement, although this was with a more moderate trade union based in
the service sector. This agreement, which now covers the majority of ITco’s German
workforce, is unlike the company-based agreements in some larger German firms, such as
Volkswagen, in that it only specifies minimum rather than actual terms and conditions.
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The implication of this is that each formally independent business unit can negotiate its
own terms and conditions with its works council. The most important substantive aspect
of the company agreement was a general increase in the working week from 36 to 38
hours, with significant flexibility to impose longer hours. As a result, German employees
at ITco now have longer working hours than their colleagues in the UK and France.
On a superficial level the same pay system operates in ITco’s German and British
subsidiaries. Nevertheless, our research indicates that the German works council has been
able to negotiate some important adaptations. First, the UK and most other European
subsidiaries financed the introduction of a 10 per cent ‘variable’ element to pay either out
of decreased merit budgets or pay cuts. The German subsidiary abolished such pay
components as the Christmas bonus, overtime pay and generous travel expenses in the
collective bargaining agreement to finance the bonus. This solution was favoured by the
works council and, according to one works council member, ITco subsidiaries in other
countries that financed it out of pay cuts caused discontent among their employees
during years when business performance was poor. Finally, there is a provision in the
company agreement which, irrespective of individual and company performance,
guarantees employees about one third of the 10 per cent bonus.
Secondly, in the UK the forced distribution on which the performance-related pay system
is based is used to identify candidates for redundancy when downsizing. In contrast, in
the German case there is a collective bargaining side-agreement which foresees training
for employees who did not receive an increase. The following quote from a senior works
council member also suggests that the German subsidiary is taking a more lenient
approach:
Of course, we [works council members] ... have given it a lot of thought. It was
important for us that nobody should be worse off. That means, when we are talking
about performance-related remuneration, there is a very small number of employees
each year who are not included in salary increases. There are measures which are
covered by a works agreement aimed at helping them [the under-performing
employees] back to better performance. And if they perform better, they will be
included in the next salary increases. These are measures such as further training,
coaching, transfer, etc. And within this system you can make up a missed salary
increase in a very short time.
In Germany, there was a series of adaptations in line with the wishes of the works councils
and the constraints of the collective bargaining system. In the UK, in contrast, there were
fewer such adaptations, but the informality of the operation of some of the elements of
the pay system meant that there were opportunities for local actors to depart from the
corporate guidelines. Thus, in contrast to Germany, adaptations to the system in the UK
subsidiary seem to occur in a rather informal way. Some of the UK employees interviewed
argued that once they got to understand the system it was possible to manipulate it, for
example by setting goals that were relatively easy to achieve, since their managers did not
have the specialist IT expertise to realise this. Another way in which employees sought to
maximize their opportunities in the appraisal system was to choose an ally to provide
feedback.
Nevertheless, besides institutional constraints, an adaptation to the global or European
pay system may also be demanded by local management, as the following quote from a
UK-based HR manager who is designing European-wide IT solutions for HR problems
suggests:
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The Germans have given me two pages full of differences between their global
variable pay and my tool and it’s all down to engineering. Nothing they’ve asked for
is fundamentally wrong, it’s down to the fiftieth degree of precision and detail, you
know, so whereas we might say that where you are at the end of the year is where
you get your variable pay paid, because sometimes it’s variances by business, you
know. The people in ITco UK accept that, and if somebody changes in about the third
or fourth quarter and their previous business did tremendously well, and their new
business hasn’t done so well and their variable pay is impacted, there’s manual
intervention and the managers both agree that in fact the bloke has been
disadvantaged, let’s give him the variable pay from the previous thing and this affects
5% of the employees – there might be a dialogue about them. Well, Germany’s
mechanized all of that! Right? So this is mechanized to handle the 2%, the 3%, the
4%, the 5%, and that’s what I can’t do. Certainly not initially.
The impact of Logistico’s global pay system
In contrast to ITco, a standardized system of performance management exists only for
managerial staff at Logistico. With regard to operational employees, individual countries
have more scope to adapt. Managerial pay at Logistico (applicable from supervisor
upwards) consists of several components. First, there are global grading structures with
the aim of coordinating the grading of similar job families using Hay. Secondly, there is a
performance-related component. The overall budget for performance pay is set by the
salary committee at regional level and is based on the financial performance of the
European region. Recommended country budgets are then defined based on economic
indicators. Performance-related pay is based on a so-called ‘quality performance review’,
a globally defined tool which can be downloaded from the Intranet. Yearly objectives are
reviewed after six months and evaluated at the end of the period. The quality
performance review is based on a review of critical skills. There is a globally defined
broad-band pay structure. As yet there is no forced distribution, but rather broad
guidelines:
The pay scales, the minimum, midpoint and maximum for each grade, would be
reviewed along similar guidelines and so you’re given broad guidelines, budgetary
guidelines, and then provided that whatever you do is within those guidelines, you
then would operate that within the country. (UK HR manager)
Thirdly, there is a share ownership programme for managerial employees which was
established in the 1930s and applies globally to all managerial employees from supervisor
upwards. Each year a certain percentage of profits is allocated to it. A global policy
defines the bands and the amount of shares allocated to each hierarchical position. The
programme is performance-related and involves an annual nomination process.
Depending on whether expected performance has been achieved, managerial employees
are either nominated or not: according to all German interviewees, in practice it rarely
happens that managers are not nominated. The share ownership programme represents
a significant element of managerial pay: for example, it can make up 25–30 per cent of a
supervisor’s salary. Several interviewees argued that it plays an important role in the very
low fluctuation amongst managerial staff in Logistico.
Overall, we did not detect any deviations from this global system in the German or UK
subsidiary. However, pay for non-managerial staff in both countries is determined by
collective bargaining. In the UK this excludes clerical staff, for whom salaries are
individually determined and linked to performance. In Germany, in the early 1990s
Logistico voluntarily joined the employers’ association and since then has been covered
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by multi-employer bargaining. A major reason for this move was that it lacked
information about the pay dynamics in the industry and wanted to maintain its pay
differential to its competitors. By participating in the collective bargaining committee,
the company has access to information about planned increases in wages and can increase
its non-managerial wages accordingly and before collective bargaining begins. According
to management, Logistico is regarded as an outsider in the employers’ association and
plays a ‘reserved and quiet role’, seeking primarily to gain information. However, as it
aims to pay at the 75th percentile within the group of immediate competitors, collective
bargaining does not in practice restrict the use of performance-related pay.
In Germany, non-managerial employees are in effect paid an hourly wage plus overtime.
Although performance measures are established by the global work measurement
standards, performance is not linked to remuneration as this is not allowed by law in the
transport sector. However, there is a so-called sales lead programme, which applies in
Germany and throughout Europe, where drivers are rewarded with incentives if they
acquire new customers on their rounds. In contrast to Germany, drivers in the UK can
receive a bonus depending on their performance as measured against the global work
measurement standards, which can make up a considerable part of their salary:
There is a recognized [Logistico] work measurement system that would operate in
different countries, but the way those measures might be used would vary from
country to country. So we have a fairly standard way of approaching [the] driver bonus
in the UK, we have a measured day and then you’d measure performance against that
measured day, but in another country those measures might be just used for internal
management purposes and not have any relationship with pay whatsoever. Or there
might be a much [smaller] element of variable pay in a different country compared to
the UK. (UK manager)
Business Services
There is a global framework of performance management at Business Services which can
be adapted to local conditions. The extent of global standardization versus localization
depends on hierarchical level. Payment for associate partners and partners is handled
globally and decisions cannot be changed at regional level: ‘if I make a decision for my
associate partner in the United Kingdom, he is going to get [a] 10 per cent bonus … The
UK is not going to tell me you can’t give him 10, it has to be 9’. For hierarchical levels
below associate partner, there is more local variation. Payment is underpinned by a global
framework linked to the global assessment process. There is a global performance
ranking system, but how this translates into pay increases is decided at the level of the
geographic unit, depending on market conditions:
The way you are ranked, for example the 20 per cent in the top category, that is
common across the globe. How that translates into pay is dependent on the
geography and some geographies have broad banding, others have the points system
that we [the UK] have, it just depends very much on the market. (UK HR manager,
Business Services)
A points system operates in both Germany and the UK. Payment is made up of three
components. The most important element is individual performance. This is based on an
annual assessment which has a standard form (developed in the UK) and a standard
timetable throughout the company. This assessment serves to determine the performance
mark that is awarded to an employee and which determines whether he or she can be
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promoted to the next level. Performance is evaluated in terms of behavioural criteria
which are different for each career or hierarchical level. The employee’s career counsellor
consolidates the ongoing appraisals: in contrast to project managers, this person is
permanently allocated to an employee. If performance is not good enough, this is
communicated very clearly to employees.
The second element is local market conditions. These are established through
benchmarking against other consulting firms and, for example, investment banks,
depending on where the company is losing its employees to. Traditionally, there was no
variation in this element of pay across the market units within a geographic unit,
meaning that employees in the financial services market unit were paid the same as
employees in the government market unit. At the time of the interviews, proposals to
move towards a more variable pay structure had been designed at global level and local
HR teams were looking at how these proposals would translate into payment models in
each geographic unit. One of the arguments for moving towards a more variable pay
structure is that it would allow more variation between market units. The third pay
component is hierarchical level. Business Services enjoys considerable flexibility in
implementing the global payment framework in Germany, as its German operations,
similar to most other consultancy firms, are not covered by collective agreements.
However, restrictions on the introduction of global payment policies have come from
another direction in Germany, from the employees themselves. One interviewee reported
that global proposals for a more variable pay structure created a lot of resistance amongst
consulting staff in Germany but also in Switzerland and Austria:
It aimed to produce large differences in pay for performance, i.e. that top performers
would receive much higher pay than good or average performers … which was
something which we had not had in such an extreme form before. There was a lot of
resistance in Germany, and in Austria and Switzerland, because it goes against our
culture. … The attitude in Germany is that if someone performs very well, they should
be paid very well. But someone who performs well should also be paid well. We didn’t
want to have such large differences; we found them just too blatant. (German HR
manager, Business Services)
As a result, the policy was introduced in a weaker form and was then adapted
considerably a year later. In contrast, the pay proposals met with very little resistance from
the company’s British workforce as they were very much in line with local practices.
Moves towards standardization at CPGco
In comparison with the other three sample firms, CPGco has had the least standardized
global pay and performance system. A combination of individual and business unit
performance determines take-home pay at CPGco. It calculates pay increases for
managers using a formal scheme in which a certain proportion of the increase is related
to individual targets, but a larger percentage to business unit and corporate goals.
Variable pay components are bound to goal achievement and account for between 18
and 30 per cent of total pay for top management in both the UK and Germany. Whereas
in the past individual goals were predominant, today collective European goal
achievement is more important. A further global element is a general stock option
scheme for all employees where each employee in 1999 and 2001 received 100 stock
options. Nevertheless, except for the stock options, in both countries the system described
above applies only from middle managers upwards.
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A new global performance appraisal was introduced in 2000. Each manager is assessed on
individual performance (target achievement) on an A to F scale and also on the extent to
which the corporate values (e.g. leadership, valuing diversity) are implemented (1 to 5).
The former is based on a 360-degree feedback appraisal for middle managers focusing on
employee, customer and shareholder goal satisfaction. This results in a combined mark. In
this way, CPGco uses remuneration to reinforce, and sometimes to change, corporate
values.
At the time of the research the corporation was discussing linking the performance
appraisal directly to merit increases and to base it on a forced distribution. The German
HR manager interviewed opposed this and also suggested that the system of target
setting was always controversial. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the German
subsidiary does not follow headquarters’ wishes to make pay more performance-related
for the majority of the workforce. In theory, there is a potential clash between such
demands and the German system of multi-employer collective bargaining. However, in
recent years CPGco Germany has moved all of its operations from the metal industry
agreement to a sub-agreement of the chemical industry. A major advantage of this move
for CPGco is that the minimum wage for a particular position set by the collective
bargaining agreement is much lower, thus increasing pay flexibility and leaving more
room for performance-related pay. Furthermore, as any employee whose salary is
significantly higher than the highest wage defined by the collective bargaining
agreement is an exempt and as this is much lower in the new agreement, the percentage
of non-tariff employees or exempts has substantially increased to 70 to 80 per cent of the
workforce in the German headquarters. Hence, for the majority of the workforce, annual
salary increases are no longer guaranteed. Even more important is that due to this change
working hours for tariff employees have increased from 35 to 37.5 hours. Furthermore,
exempts, who are nowadays the majority of the workforce, are expected to work
overtime without any extra compensation. An additional advantage of this move from
the employer’s perspective is that CPGco is the biggest employer in its new employers’
association and thus has a bigger impact on bargaining outcomes. Nevertheless, at the
time of our research in Germany not all managers (particularly those who were covered
by collective bargaining before) had variable pay. However, as there is strong pressure
from headquarters on German HR management to have a global or at least unified
European system of variable pay, this issue was discussed with employee representatives.
Conclusions
The management of pay and performance shows a high degree of imposed uniformity.
While the details of pay and grading systems may vary slightly from one country to
another, all sample firms try to ensure that the essential parameters of pay and
performance management apply globally. Although the wage determination and
appraisal systems differ between the four MNCs studied, a common trend is their
emphasis on individual pay-for-performance. In all four firms, poor performers might not
only not get a bonus, but also not receive a merit increase. ITco and Business Services
ensure adherence to this policy by linking pay to a forced distribution appraisal.
Although some of the British employees interviewed suggested that there are ways to
manipulate the appraisal, generally we observed little resistance to the introduction of
central pay policies or any significant deviations. This was different in the German
subsidiaries. In all four firms pay practices differed at least to some degree from global
policies. However, this is not primarily due to multi-employer collective bargaining.
30
HR MANAGEMENT OF US MULTINATIONALS
© Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society
Instead, the examples of CPGco, ITco and Logistico show how MNCs can use the space the
system offers to reduce its impact. At least as important as collective bargaining was
codetermination. For example, works council members at ITco used company-level
bargaining to ensure that poor performers got at least a small bonus and that training
helped them to improve their performance.
Besides these two institutional factors, the interviews suggest that German employees
may have reservations about too much emphasis being placed on individual performance-
related rewards. At Business Services, where collective bargaining and codetermination
had no impact, this antagonism led to the adaptation of a global policy and at CPGco it
slowed down the implementation of a new wage determination system. However, despite
these observations it is interesting to note the extent to which pay in the US MNCs is still
performance-related. This differs markedly from practices in German firms (Muller, 1999;
Kurdelbusch, 2002). Nevertheless, an analysis of longitudinal data from the Cranet-E
survey of European HRM suggests that, similar to other European countries, over the
1990s performance-related pay has become more widespread in Germany (Muller-Camen
et al., 2004). Thus US MNCs may still be different, but are not as exceptional and no longer
provoke such strong resistance as in the past. In other words, changes in the host-country
business system have reduced institutional distance from the home country.
d) Workforce ‘diversity’
A striking characteristic of the four companies discussed here, as well as the other US
MNCs surveyed, is their emphasis on workforce ‘diversity’. This reflects the growing
importance of this issue in their home country, which is due to two developments. First,
legislation was passed in the 1960s to outlaw discrimination on the basis of age, disability,
gender, national origin and race. Today, this legislation, which basically affects all HR
functions, has become a decisive institutional constraint for management in the USA (e.g.
Dessler, 2003). Secondly, instead of just complying with the law, US corporations
increasingly accept a business case for diversity management. Changing workforce
demographics, which have increased the proportion of non-whites in the labour market
and are leading to an ageing of the workforce, alongside the feminization of the labour
market, necessitate policies that include and fully utilize a more diverse workforce.
Similar to the institutionalization of ‘health and safety’, this has led to the inclusion of
diversity considerations in corporate values and a broad spectrum of domestic diversity
policies, including leadership programmes, recruitment and retention systems, career
development, the promotion and management of high potentials, community relations
and supplier relations. A wide range of structures have been introduced to implement
diversity programmes, such as target-setting and monitoring; standardized training
programmes; ‘affinity groups’ for particular social categories, such as women or gays and
lesbians; and diversity ‘councils’ at different organizational levels.
Germany has been slow to consider diversity management practices (Muller-Camen and
Krüger, 2004; Wächter, Vedder and Führing, 2003). Where these practices exist in German
companies, they often cover only gender and thus appear merely to be selling
‘Frauenförderung’ (equal employment for women) under a new name. Particularly in
public sector organizations, representatives promoting equal opportunities for women
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have a relatively strong position and might wish to prevent the introduction of a broader
diversity concept (Führing, 2003). In the UK, diversity management is better known than
in Germany. However, UK scholars and companies tend to put more emphasis on top-
down state-enforced equal opportunity. There is thus greater emphasis on enforcing
existing anti-discrimination legislation than on developing a more comprehensive
diversity management concept from the bottom up (Noon, 2004).
In this section we analyse the extent to which the US MNCs studied have transferred
diversity management practices to their British and German subsidiaries and whether this
has met with any resistance.
Diversity in British and German subsidiaries of US MNCs
Given the increasing importance of diversity management in the domestic agenda and
the tendency of US MNCs to extend domestic HR policies globally, it is not surprising that
since the 1990s, US companies have begun to transfer diversity policies to their foreign
subsidiaries (e.g. Egan and Bendick, 2001). Our case-study firms are no exception. CPGco,
for example, is one of the leading companies in the USA in terms of diversity
management and is aiming to become a global leader in integrating diversity into the
business. It has an elaborate global diversity management structure with a chief diversity
officer responsible for global diversity policy, global employee diversity networks, global
diversity awards and the ‘valuing diversity’ aspect of the periodic global staff opinion
survey. Subsidiaries have to establish diversity targets and to collect and report diversity
metrics. Finally, achievement of diversity targets has been incorporated into the
performance management process for senior managers throughout the corporation, and
variable pay has in principle been affected by performance on diversity issues.
Although in the sample firms the global policies and systems for managing diversity did
not differ from those developed domestically, there was one important difference.
Whereas programmes in the US usually target various groups, the focus in the UK and
German subsidiaries was clearly on gender, although there was some focus on ethnic
minorities in the UK. A European HR manager from ITco stressed that this is partly because
of the difficulty in tracking data on ethnicity and disability in many European countries,
meaning that the company’s focus on these groups was limited to training staff to be
sensitive to the issues raised rather than monitoring the composition of the workforce.
Although the concept of equal opportunities for women is not new for British and
German firms, US MNCs seem to be at the forefront with regard to gender diversity
compared to indigenous firms. For example, ITco Germany started its first development
scheme for women in the 1960s. In 2001, 25 per cent of the German workforce was
female; their share of middle management positions was 11 per cent and of top positions
6–7 per cent, much higher than is common in German industry.
Despite the focus being only on gender, the transfer of this US policy created resistance
in the subsidiaries. Even where the case for diversity was accepted, as in the
encouragement of women into senior professional and managerial positions, there were
concerns at the methods being promoted by international diversity policy. Thus several
UK managers were sceptical about the general principle of target-setting which they saw
as doing little to remove the real barriers to the advancement of women and ethnic
minorities in the company. Targets, particularly for women in management positions,
were seen as excessively rigid by UK managers in CPGco and not always appropriate to
the British context. There was a perceived danger that such targets could violate UK and
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EU legislation prohibiting affirmative action, and there was a risk that such targets would
have a demotivating impact on male managers. The general pattern of response in the
UK subsidiaries was to try to ‘negotiate’ the terms of policy application in their local
context: for example, they could call attention to the legal framework in the UK (and the
EU), and interpret the implications for company policy, for example, in respect of ‘positive
discrimination’. This happened at CPGco where head office was frustrated at the slow
pace of meeting targets for women in senior posts. When resisting centrally-defined
policy, subsidiaries generally accepted that some constructive response to headquarters
pressure was necessary, and indeed desirable, but they tried to shape the response to fit
local needs and conditions. Thus when European managers at CPGco resisted formal
quantitative targets for women in senior posts, they proposed a locally more appropriate
response to diversity. This involved increasing the pool of women with management
potential by paying greater attention to women high-fliers by challenging recruitment
agencies to include several women on short lists, and by encouraging networks of women
managers.
Comparing the British and German subsidiaries, it seems that the UK affiliates have been
better at implementing equal employment opportunities. For example, a UK manager at
Logistico suggested:
I think the UK is probably closer to the States than it is to the rest of Europe in terms
of our development towards diversity policies in that we have internally within the UK
from our own initiative developed an equal opportunities policy and implemented it
and we do regular training, management training on equal opportunities and that’s
been because of the fact that equal opportunities law in the UK is much more strongly
developed than in the rest of Europe. To some extent we’ve built on some of the
policies and policy documents that we’ve been able to obtain from the States and it’s
been based on our own experiences of equal opportunity law … And so I think we’re
further ahead in that respect than anywhere else in Europe. I don’t think there are any
other European countries that have an as well defined equal opportunities policy at
[Logistico] as we do in the UK.
With regard to Logistico Germany other interviews confirm this view. Although its
German workforce is highly international, with drivers originating from 39 different
countries, there are no explicit diversity or equal employment policies. Interestingly, only
gender ratios are calculated and reported to headquarters. When workforce diversity was
raised, our respondents at Logistico and the other firms tended to point only to initiatives
to increase the percentage of female managers.
Particularly at CPGco Germany we encountered some cynicism among managers about
corporate diversity management initiatives. For example, the HR manager interviewed
suggested: ‘I would appreciate if our CEO would put a similar emphasis on other issues as
he does on diversity. … From an economic point of view diversity is probably not efficient.
… For me and many of my colleagues there is much too much activity on this issue.’
The US emphasis on diversity can also help subsidiary managers to enhance their position.
At Business Services, Logistico and CPGco local managers challenged the under-
representation of non-Americans in the top leadership tiers of their company. The
outcome has been that these firms are putting a growing emphasis on ‘passport diversity’
by, for example, fast-tracking managers of other nationalities.
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Conclusions
We have argued that diversity policy in US MNCs is a reflection of a domestic business
agenda which is shaped by legislation and the demographics of the American population
and labour force. This policy has tended to be internationalized in ways that subsidiaries
regarded as inappropriate for the local environment, putting pressure on them to devote
more resources to the issue than they felt was justified. There were also instances where
headquarters diversity policies conflicted with UK and EU legislative frameworks.
Subsidiaries tried to soften the impact by resisting some of the elements of diversity
policy, such as precise targets, and by putting more emphasis on support structures to help
diversity groups, particularly women. The way in which US MNCs deal with diversity is
‘ethnocentric’: policies are developed in the domestic arena and when internationalized
their form, substance and underlying assumptions are retained, with only minor
variations. Despite more emphasis on passport diversity, there has been little
‘democratization’ of international HR policy-making in these companies. It is still
dominated by the USA, with relatively little input from managers from other regions and
subsidiaries.
Nevertheless, although the evidence is limited, it appears that the UK subsidiaries are
under greater pressure to follow global diversity management policies than their German
counterparts. This suggests that corporate headquarters take into account that national
contexts are more or less open to diversity management initiatives.
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5 Transferring Americanness:
adapting policy and practice in the
British and German environments
This research started from the premise that the behaviour of MNCs is influenced by the
distinctive nature of the national business system in which they originate. The empirical
findings allow some general conclusions to be drawn about the ‘Americanness’ of US
MNCs, and about the nature of the process whereby Americanness is transmitted to their
British and German subsidiaries. They demonstrate a strong headquarters influence on
the subsidiaries of US MNCs in the UK and Germany, both on the specific HR issues of pay,
employee representation and diversity, and on more ‘processual’ traits, such as the degree
of centralization. We have shown that to a large extent this behaviour can be traced back
to particular features of the US business system.
US MNCs tend to operate in a fairly centralized way, managing through standardized
formal systems, processes and policies. Our case-study companies are markedly
‘ethnocentric’ and tend to apply the same approaches to their overseas operations as to
their domestic ones. We explained this centralism partly by reference to the traditionally
overwhelming predominance of the American domestic market. However, three of our
four companies are now highly internationalized and have 40 per cent or more of their
workforce overseas. We suggest that the continuing influence of the centre is due in part
to the ‘organizational capabilities’ – the management control systems and policies – that
are one of the defining competitive advantages of US companies.
Initially, we expected not only that US MNCs would want to transfer practices to their
subsidiaries, but also that the transmission of such country-of-origin influences to
subsidiaries in the UK would be relatively smooth, as the British ‘liberal market’ model
appears to provide an ideal site for evidence of ‘Americanness’, given its many similarities
to the US model and the relative absence of institutional constraints that might block the
absorption of American practices. However, the findings show that the elements of
Americanness are not set in stone but are changeable and adaptable. Importantly,
practices are modified by contact with the host environment, even one as similar to the
USA as the UK. Compared to Germany, we observed only minor adjustments due to
legislation. However, even where legislation is not a constraint, different traditions and
structures operate in the British business system, and these often define how American
traits are manifest in the UK context. For example, British subsidiaries often applied
corporate policy on unions and collective representation in a more pragmatic and
accommodating way than the parent company did.
Initially, we expected that, in contrast to the UK, host-country effects would be
particularly pronounced in Germany. US MNCs would, for example, need to engage in
collective bargaining and accept workplace representation in Germany. This expectation
was confirmed at least to some degree. The MNCs studied were less successful in
transferring their non-union policies to Germany than to the UK. With the exception of
Business Services, all were engaged in collective bargaining and codetermination covered
most of their German operations. As a result, global policies, particularly with regard to
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pay, had to be adapted. However, national-level institutions not only alter over time, but
also leave social space that MNCs can use. A good example is pay. Multi-employer
bargaining in Germany has become less encompassing over the last decade. This leaves
more room for MNCs either to avoid it or to limit its influence. As performance-related
pay is becoming more accepted in indigenous firms, it is less contested in MNC
subsidiaries.
The German example is also interesting as it indicates how the ‘cultural’ predisposition of
actors, particularly powerful ones such as senior managers, can have an impact on the
operation of MNCs. It seems that German managers are sometimes more eager to please
headquarters by implementing global policies than their colleagues in the UK and other
European countries. For example, ITco Germany was not only the first subsidiary to split
up into different companies when this was demanded by headquarters in the 1990s, but
also the first in Europe to introduce the variable pay system. Based on his experience as
European HR director, one of our UK respondents observed: ‘If ITco Europe asked the
Germans to do something, they went and did it. If the French were asked to do something
they went on and did nothing. And if you asked the British they would say: Why?’. A
similar view emerged from interviews at Logistico (see Box 4).
Finally, rather than perceiving institutions primarily as a constraint, they can also be used
as a resource (Wächter and Müller-Camen, 2002). Several examples (e.g. working hours at
ITco, induction training at Logistico) show how the German institutional environment can
foster the implementation of global policies.
For practitioners interested in organizational learning, and for policy-makers concerned
with MNCs as mechanisms for bringing innovative practices to Germany and the UK, the
findings have a number of implications. Most fundamentally, the transfer of policies and
practices is not a smooth technical process and MNCs are not just rationalistic, economic
calculating machines, nor are they a top-down tool in the hands of senior management.
Rather they are structures of power and influence, coalitions of interests constantly
seeking ways to accommodate different perspectives and objectives. They pursue their
goals and activities through groups and actors at different organizational levels and in
different roles and functions. These groups have their own interests and often control
power resources, ranging from finance to knowledge and skills, with which they can exert
leverage that may run counter to the formal line of control. In short, politics is important.
The distinguishing feature of such politics in MNCs is that managers and other groups of
employees in the subsidiaries have specific power resources, notably their expertise in
understanding and interpreting the constraints and opportunities of the local
environment to corporate headquarters. They have their own local networks, for example
with government or local authorities, suppliers or unions, which they can mobilize in
pursuit of their interests. The interests of subsidiaries may not necessarily coincide with
those of the centre (as when headquarters decides to relocate production to another
country), and subsidiaries themselves have to act to accommodate a range of different
organizational interests at local level, notably employees, works councils and unions. All
this generates a pervasive pattern of bargaining over the terms of implementation of
imported policies, and hence influences how companies transmit organizational learning
and innovation to their subsidiaries.
While American MNCs have a reputation for central control of policy, our case studies
show how skilful subsidiary managers can mobilize the appropriate ‘rhetoric’ – invoking,
for example, the ‘business case’ – to give more legitimacy to their proposed course of
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action. More than on other management functions, institutional distance has an impact
on HRM. In the UK and in particular in Germany, host-country nationals are needed to
help MNCs to adapt global policies to the local context. Therefore, not surprisingly, we
encountered very few expatriates in the HR function of the subsidiaries we have studied.
Potential investors tend to regard the German system as being very strongly regulated.
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Box 4
National differences in complying with headquarters
My 25 years’ experience working for [Logistico] in Germany is that the German
mentality is very easy for Americans to manage. We do what we are told. There
are lots of laws but there are ways around them. Germans always try to apply the
law in such a way that there are no problems or complications. We were the first
subsidiary in Europe and even if we had tried to hide behind the regulations of
the Works Constitution Act, the Americans would soon have known. But the
Dutch, Belgians or English say ‘well we can’t do that, we are prevented from doing
so by law’ … The British don’t even try … The Americans have understood that.
But when it comes to the Germans, they say, ‘the Germans will manage it’. I think
we made some mistakes at the outset … We saw ourselves as pioneers and we
wanted the company to be a success … We have always tried to find a solution
and the Americans realized that very quickly. The other European countries have
done it differently, for example the French are very rigid or in the UK, they set
working hours or pay levels themselves and there is no room for discussion.
(Manager, Logistico Germany)
It’s my impression that German management is afraid of US management. My
experience is that management in other European countries, such as Holland and
the UK, are a lot more assertive. They say: ‘this is our country. Sure, we belong to
[Logistico], but we work to our own policies’. German managers have a tendency
to do everything perfectly. They want to show that they have climbed up from the
bottom to the top. In order to do that, they have to do everything they are
instructed to do. I think that that is the reason why we adopt so much that comes
from America. Management does it because they want to keep their positions …
Particularly in the past, management was not willing to adapt anything. The
attitude was that if you did not comply, you were damaging the company. (Works
council member, Logistico Germany)
In comparison, UK management is more willing to pick and choose which elements of
global policies it implements and seems to have more freedom to do so:
Provided that the case that has been made on behalf of the country stands up
then they’ll [corporate management] go away and say obviously it’s not going to
work in that country. For instance, there’s something called an employee dispute
resolution procedure, and we said well we’re not going to do it, it doesn’t fit our
culture, our stage of development, our industrial relations policy … what we’ve
done is pretty much cherry-pick, you know, what we’ve found to be useful or
potentially useful and make use of it. That kind of implies that you might be able
to reject some things if you cherry-pick others, but you know there obviously are
those things that are mandatory, and, you know, there’s by and large things that
we’re pretty comfortable with anyway. (HR manager, Logistico UK)
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They focus particularly on hard factors such as indirect labour costs and often fail to
recognize the scope for flexibility which the German system offers. Protection against
dismissal legislation is regarded as the most restrictive labour regulation and often
discourages potential investors from choosing Germany as an investment location, the UK
and Ireland being regarded as much more attractive in this respect. In contrast, companies
which have invested successfully in the German business system have learnt how to
challenge and use institutional restrictions in order to be locally responsive to the
rigidities of the system at the same time as being able to implement standardized HR
strategies. Such companies place significant demands on the German system with the
result that their German subsidiaries are successful and productive. Moreover, the
Europeanization of management structures and HRM strategies has already begun to
pose further challenges to German institutions, as decisions affecting American
companies’ investment and strategies in Germany are made elsewhere and HRM
strategies are increasingly designed to satisfy European business requirements rather
than to fit national institutional trajectories (Wächter et al., 2003).
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